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Abstract
Non-local games are studied in quantum information because they
provide a simple way for proving the difference between the classical world
and the quantum world. A non-local game is a cooperative game played
by 2 or more players against a referee. The players cannot communicate
but may share common random bits or a common quantum state. A
referee sends an input xi to the i
th player who then responds by sending
an answer ai to the referee. The players win if the answers ai satisfy a
condition that may depend on the inputs xi.
Typically, non-local games are studied in a framework where the ref-
eree picks the inputs from a known probability distribution. We initiate
the study of non-local games in a worst-case scenario when the referee’s
probability distribution is unknown and study several non-local games in
this scenario.
1 Overview
Quantum mechanics is strikingly different from classical physics. In the
area of information processing, this difference can be seen through quan-
tum algorithms which can be exponentially faster than conventional algo-
rithms [10, 9] and through quantum cryptography which offers degree of
security that is impossible classically [4].
Another information-theoretic way of seeing the difference between
quantum mechanics and the classical world is through non-local games.
An example of non-local game is the CHSH (Clauser-Horne-Shimonyi-
Holt) game [6]. This is a game played by two parties against a referee.
The two parties cannot communicate but can share common randomness
or common quantum state that is prepared before the beginning of the
∗Supported by ESF project 2009/0216/1DP/1.1.1.2.0/09/APIA/VIAA/044, FP7 Marie
Curie International Reintegration Grant PIRG02-GA-2007-224886 and FP7 FET-Open
project QCS.
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game. The referee prepares two uniformly random bits x, y and gives one
of them to each of two parties. The parties reply by sending bits a and b to
the referee. They win if a⊕ b = x∧ y. The maximum winning probability
that can be achieved is 0.75 classically and 1
2
+ 1
2
√
2
= 0.85... quantumly.
Other non-local games can be obtained by changing the winning con-
ditions, replacing bits x, y with values x, y ∈ {1, . . . ,m} or changing the
number of parties. The common feature is that all non-local games involve
parties that cannot communicate but can share common random bits or
common quantum states.
There are several reasons why non-local games are interesting. First,
CHSH game provides a very simple example to test validity of quantum
mechanics. If we have implemented the referee and the two players by
devices so that there is no communication possible between A and B
and we observe the winning probability of 0.85..., there is no classical
explanation possible. Second, non-local games have been used in device-
independent cryptography.
Non-local games are typically analyzed with the referee acting accord-
ing to some probability distribution. For example, in the case of the CHSH
game, the referee chooses each of possible pairs of bits (0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0),
(1, 1) as (x, y) with equal probabilities 1/4. In this paper, we initiate
study of non-local games in a worst case setting, when the referee’s prob-
ability distribution is unknown and the players have to achieve winning
probability at least p for every possible input (x, y).
We analyze a number of games in the worst-case framework. For some
of them, the worst-case winning probability turns out to be the same as the
winning probability under the typically studied probability distributions.
For example, for the CHSH game, the worst-case winning probability is
the same 0.75 classically and 1
2
+ 1
2
√
2
= 0.85... quantumly.
2 Technical preliminaries
We will study non-local games of the following kind [7] in both classi-
cal and quantum settings. There are n players A1, A2, . . . , An which
cooperate between themselves to maximize the game value (see below),
and there is a referee. Before the game the players may share a common
source of correlated random data: in the classical case, a common random
variable R taking values in a finite set R, and in the quantum case, an
entangled n-part quantum state |ψ〉 ∈ A1⊗ . . .⊗An (where Ai is a finite-
dimensional subspace corresponding to the part of the state available to
the player Ai). During the game the players cannot communicate between
themselves.
Each of the players (Ai) has a finite set of possible input data: Xi.
At the start of the game the referee randomly picks values (x1, . . . , xn) =
x ∈ X1× . . .×Xn according to some probability distribution π, and sends
each of the players his input (i. e. Ai receives xi).
Each of the players then must send the referee a response ai which
may depend on the input and the common random data source. (Any
additional, local randomization the player could employ can be techni-
cally incorporated in the random variable R, so we will disregard it.) In
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this paper we will consider only binary games, that is games where the
responses are simply bits: ai ∈ {0, 1}. We denote (a1, . . . , an) by a.
The referee checks whether the players have won by some predicate
(known to all parties) depending on the players’ inputs and outputs: V (a |
x). For convenience in formulas, we will suppose that V takes value 1
when it is true and −1 when it is false. A binary game whose outcome
actually depends only on the XOR of the players’ responses: V (a | x) =
V ′(
⊕n
i=1 ai | x), is called an XOR game. A game for which the outcome
does not change after any permutation of the players (i. e. V (γ(a) |
γ(x)) = V (a | x) for any permutation γ) is called a symmetric game.
The value ω of a non-local game G for given strategies of the players
is the difference between the probability that the players win and the
probability that they lose:
ω(G) = Pr[V (a | x) = 1]− Pr[V (a | x) = −1] ∈ [−1, 1].
The probability that the players win can then be expressed by the game
value in this way: Pr[V (a | x) = 1] = 1
2
+ 1
2
ω(G).
In the classical case, the players’ strategy is the random variable R
and a set of functions ai : Xi × R → {0, 1} determining the responses.
The maximal classical game value achievable by the players for a given
probability distribution π is thus:
ωpic (G) = sup
R,a
∑
r,x
π(x)Pr[R = r]V (a1(x1, r), . . . , an(xn, r) | x).
However, actually the use of random variable here is redundant, since in
the expression it provides a convex combination of deterministic strategy
game values, thus the maximum is achieved by some deterministic strategy
(with ai : Xi → {0, 1}):
ωpic (G) = max
a
∑
x
π(x)V (a1(x1), . . . , an(xn) | x).
In this paper we investigate the case when the players do not know
the input values probability distribution π used by the referee, and must
maximize the game value for the worst distribution π that the referee
could choose, given the strategy picked by the players. We will call it the
worst-case game value. The maximal classical worst-case game value ωc
achievable by the players is given by the formula
ωc(G) = sup
R,a
min
pi
∑
r,x
π(x)Pr[R = r]V (a1(x1, r), . . . , an(xn, r) | x).
Note that in the worst-case approach the optimal strategy cannot be a
deterministic one, unless there is a deterministic strategy winning on all
inputs: if there is an input on which the strategy loses, then the referee
can supply it with certainty, and the players always lose. Clearly, ωc(G) ≤
ωpic (G) for any π.
In the most of the studied examples π has been the uniform distribu-
tion. We will call it the average case and denote its maximum game value
by ωunic (G).
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In the quantum case, the players’ strategy is the state |ψ〉 and the
measurements that the players pick depending on the received inputs and
perform on their parts of |ψ〉 to determine their responses. Mathemati-
cally, the measurement performed by Ai after receiving input xi is a pair
of positive semidefinite dimAi-dimensional matrices M0|xii , M1|xii with
M
0|xi
i +M
1|xi
i = I where I is the identity matrix. We denote the collec-
tion of all measurements by M.
The maximum quantum game value for a fixed distribution π is
ωpiq (G) = sup
|ψ〉,M
∑
x,a
π(x)〈ψ|
n⊗
i=1
M
ai|xi
i |ψ〉V (a | x),
and the maximum quantum worst-case game value is
ωq(G) = sup
|ψ〉,M
min
pi
∑
x,a
π(x)〈ψ|
n⊗
i=1
M
ai|xi
i |ψ〉V (a | x).
Since the shared entangled state can be used to simulate a random
variable, ωq(G) ≥ ωc(G) and for any π: ωpiq (G) ≥ ωpic (G).
In the case of two player games (n = 2) we will use notation A,B
for the players, X,Y for the input sets, x, y for the inputs, a, b for the
responses, A,B for the players’ subspaces.
3 Games with worst case equal to aver-
age case
For several commonly studied non-local games, the worst case and the
average case game values are the same: ωunic = ωc and ω
uni
q = ωq . The
reason for that is the natural symmetries of the non-local games. These
symmetries often result in natural strategies which achieve the game value
ωunic or ω
uni
q on all inputs simultaneously, thus proving that ω
uni
c = ωc or
ωuniq = ωq.
We show that this happens for two well-known non-local games: CHSH
game (which is a canonical example of a 2-player non-local game with a
quantum advantage) and Mermin-Ardehali game (which is the n-player
XOR game with the biggest advantage for quantum strategies). Other
examples with ωunic = ωc and ω
uni
q = ωq (for similar reasons) are the Odd
Cycle game of [7] and the Magic Square game of [3, 7].
3.1 CHSH game
The CHSH game is a two player XOR game with X = Y = {0, 1}, V (a, b |
x, y) = a⊕b ≡ x∧y, and π the uniform distribution. It is easy to check that
no deterministic strategy can win on all inputs, but the strategy a(x) = 0,
b(y) = 0 wins on 3 inputs out of 4, so [7]: ωunic (CHSH) = 0.75−0.25 = 0.5.
Moreover, since out of the four strategies S1: a(x) = 0, b(y) = 0; S2:
a(x) = x, b(y) = 0; S3: a(x) = 0, b(y) = y; S4: a(x) = x, b(y) = ¬y each
one loses on a different input, and wins on the 3 other ones, we have for
any predetermined π: ωpic (CHSH) = 1 − 2minx,y π(x, y) ≥ 0.5. Indeed,
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one can pick the strategy losing on the input with the minimal value of
π.
Theorem 1 ωc(CHSH) = 0.5.
Proof: If the players use the random variable R to pick one of the atrate-
gies S1, S2, S3, S4 mentioned above with equal probability (i. e. 0.25),
then for any input x, y they will have a winning strategy with probabil-
ity 0.75. Thus ωc(CHSH) ≥ 0.5. On the other hand, ωc(CHSH) ≤
ωunic (CHSH) = 0.5.
[7] shows that the winning probability in the quantum case is 1
2
+ 1
2
√
2
giving ωuniq (CHSH) = 1/
√
2. Moreover, the used strategy achieves this
value on every input x, y, therefore it gives also the worst-case value:
Theorem 2 ωq(CHSH) = 1/
√
2.
3.2 Mermin-Ardehali game
Mermin-Ardehali (MA) game [8, 2] is an n-player XOR game with X1 =
. . . = Xn = {0, 1} and the winning condition: a1 ⊕ . . . ⊕ an = 0 if
(x1+. . .+xn) mod 4 ∈ {0, 1} and a1⊕. . .⊕an = 1 if (x1+. . .+xn) mod 4 ∈
{2, 3}.
For the uniform distribution on the inputs, this game can be won with
probability 1
2
+ 1
2
√
2
quantumly and 1
2
+ 1
2
⌊n
2
+1⌋ classically [8, 2, 1]. Thus,
the ratio between its quantum and classical values,
ωuniq (MA)
ωunic (MA)
, is equal to
2⌊
n
2
⌋− 1
2 .
This game corresponds to Mermin-Ardehali n-partite Bell inequality
[8, 2]. For even n, this inequality is the Bell inequality that can be violated
by the biggest possible margin in the quantum theory [11].
Namely, Werner and Wolf [11] have shown the following theorem
(translated here from the language of Bell inequalities to the language
of XOR games):
Theorem 3 [11] No n-party XOR game G with binary inputs xi (with
any input distribution π) achieves
ωpiq (G)
ωpic (G)
> 2
n−1
2 .
This makes the worst-case analysis of Mermin-Ardehali game for even
n quite straightforward. For the quantum case, the maximal game value
1√
2
is given by a quantum strategy which achieves it on every input [8, 2, 1],
thus
Theorem 4 For all n: ωq(MA) = 1/
√
2.
For the classical case, the worst-case game value cannot be better
than the game value 2−
n
2 for the uniform distribution. If the worst-case
value was ωc(MA) < 2
−n
2 then, by Yao’s principle [12], there would be a
specific probability distribution π for which no classical strategy achieves
value exceeding ωc(MA). Then, we would obtain a ratio
ωpiq (MA)
ωpic (MA)
> 2
n−1
2
(because the quantum game value would still be at least 1/
√
2), contrary
to Theorem 3. Hence
Theorem 5 For even n: ωc(MA) = 2
−n
2 .
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By similar reasoning, 2−
n
2 is a lower bound for the classical worst-case
game value for odd n. However, the best upper bound that we can prove in
this case is 2−
n−1
2 (because this is the value for the uniform distribution).
4 Games with worst case different from
average case
In the previous section, we saw that, for many well-known non-local
games, the worst case probability distribution is the uniform distribution.
We now present several games for which this is not the case.
4.1 EQUAL-EQUAL game
We define EQUAL-EQUAL (EEm) as a two-player XOR game with X =
Y = {1, . . . ,m} and V (a, b | x, y) def= (x = y) ≡ (a = b).
This is a natural variation of the Odd-Cycle game of [7]. For m = 3,
the Odd-Cycle game can be viewed as a game in which the players attempt
to prove to the referee that they have 3 bits a1, a2, a3 ∈ {0, 1} which all
have different values.
This can be generalized to larger m in two different ways. The first
generalization is the Odd-Cycle game [7] in which the players attempt
to prove to the referee that an m-cycle (for m odd) is 2-colorable. The
second generalization is a game in which the players attempt to prove that
they have m bits a1, . . . , am ∈ {0, 1} which all have different values. This
is our EQUAL-EQUAL game.
Theorem 6 For even m: ωc(EEm) =
m
3m−4 , and for odd m: ωc(EEm) =
m+1
3m−1 .
Proof: For the lower bound, we provide a strategy achieving the needed
game value on all inputs. It uses the random variable R to obtain the
following probabilistic mix of deterministic strategies: with some proba-
bility p the strategy having a = 0 and b = 1 on all inputs is picked, and
with probability 1− p a strategy of the following kind is chosen uniformly
randomly: for some fixed ⌊m/2⌋ input values i: a(i) = b(i) = 0, and for
the remaining ⌈m/2⌉ values i: a(i) = b(i) = 1.
The first strategy wins with certainty if x 6= y, and loses if x = y.
The strategy mix of the other case wins with certainty if x = y. In the
case x 6= y a particular strategy of the mix loses iff a(x) = b(y). There
are ⌊(m− 1)2/2⌋ such input pairs among the m(m− 1) pairs with x 6= y.
Picking the strategy randomly, for any such input pair we get that the
probability of losing is ⌊(m−1)
2/2⌋
m(m−1) .
Easy calculations show that by picking p = m−2
3m−4 for even m and
p = m−1
3m−1 for odd m, we obtain the desired game value for both cases
x = y and x 6= y.
For the upper bound, we provide a probability distribution π for which
no deterministic strategy can exceed the game value of the theorem’s
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statement. Let us denote by πα,β a distribution having πα,β(i, i) = α for
any i and πα,β(i, j) = β for any distinct i, j. We will use πα,β with
α =
{
m−1
m(3m−1) if m is odd,
m−2
m(3m−4) if m is even,
β =
{
2
(m−1)(3m−1) if m is odd,
2
m(3m−4) if m is even.
(1)
Consider a deterministic strategy. The input values i are split into two
classes: the ones with a(i) 6= b(i) and the ones with a(i) = b(i). We denote
the number of the elements of the first class with k. Let us estimate from
below the probability of loss ploss.
The cases when x = y and both x, y belong to the first class contribute
kα to ploss.
If i belongs to the first class, and j to the second, then the strategy
loses in exactly one of the cases x = i, y = j and x = j, y = i, since
exactly one of the different values a(i), b(i) will coincide with a(j) = b(j).
That contributes k(m− k)β to ploss.
Finally, if both x and y are from the second class, then a(x) = b(x) and
a(y) = b(y), and the strategy loses if x 6= y and a(x) = a(y). It is easy to
check that the minimum number of loss cases ⌊(m−k−1)2/2⌋ is achieved
when the number of values i with a(i) = b(i) = 0 is the nearest possible to
one half of the elements of the class. The contribution to ploss in this case is
⌊(m−k−1)2/2⌋β. Thus we have ploss ≥ kα+k(m−k)β+⌊(m−k−1)2/2⌋β.
In all the parity cases of m and k this is a concave (quadratic) function
of k, so it achieves minimum at the minimal or maximal possible value of
k (e. g. if k and m are odd, then k = 1 or k = m). A routine checking
shows that in all these cases the desired upper bound of the game value
is obtained.
Theorem 7 For even m: ωq(EEm) =
m
3m−4 , and for odd m:
m+1
3m−1 ≤
ωq(EEm) ≤ m2+1(3m−1)(m−1) .
Proof: The lower bounds follow from ωq(EEm) ≥ ωc(EEm).
To obtain the upper bounds, we will take the probability distribu-
tion πα,β from the proof of the previous theorem and use ωq(EEm) ≤
ω
piα,β
q (EEm).
For the two-player XOR games where on every input exactly one of
the cases a ⊕ b = 0 and a ⊕ b = 1 is winning, it is useful to observe that
V (a, b | x, y) = (−1)a(−1)bV (0, 0 | x, y), and to introduce the matrix V
with Vxy = V (0, 0 | x, y). Thus, for any distribution π
ωpiq (EEm) = sup
|ψ〉,M
∑
x,y,a,b
π(x, y)〈ψ|Ma|x1 ⊗Mb|y2 |ψ〉(−1)a(−1)bVxy.
The Tsirelson’s theorem [5] implies that this game value is equal to
sup
d
max
ui:‖ui‖=1
max
vj :‖vj‖=1
m∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
π(i, j)Vij(ui, vj)
where u1, . . . , um, v1, . . . , vm ∈ Rd and (ui, vj) is the scalar product.
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The part of the sum containing ui is
m∑
j=1
π(i, j)Vij(ui, vj) =
(
ui,
m∑
j=1
π(i, j)Vijvj
)
.
To maximize the scalar product, ui must be the unit vector in the direction
of
∑m
j=1 π(i, j)Vijvj .
For the EQUAL-EQUAL game and the distribution πα,β we have Vij =
1 and πα,β(i, j) = α if i = j, Vij = −1 and πα,β(i, j) = β if i 6= j. So we
have to maximize the sum
S =
m∑
i=1
∥∥∥∥∥
m∑
j=1
πα,β(i, j)Vijvj
∥∥∥∥∥ =
m∑
i=1
∥∥∥∥∥∥αvi − β
m∑
j=1,j 6=i
vj
∥∥∥∥∥∥ .
Let us denote s =
∑m
j=1 vj and apply the inequality between the arith-
metic and quadratic means (and use the fact that ‖vi‖ = 1):
S2 ≤ m
m∑
i=1
‖αvi − β(s− vi)‖2 = m
m∑
i=1
‖(α+ β)vi − βs‖2
= m
(
m∑
i=1
(α+ β)2‖vi‖2 −
m∑
i=1
2(α+ β)β(vi, s) +
m∑
i=1
β2‖s‖2
)
= m
(
(α+ β)2m− 2(α+ β)β
(
m∑
i=1
vi, s
)
+mβ2‖s‖2
)
= m((α+ β)2m− 2(α+ β)β‖s‖2 +mβ2‖s‖2)
= m2(α+ β)2 + ‖s‖2mβ(mβ − 2(α+ β)).
With our values of α and β (see equation (1)) one can calculate that
the coefficient at ‖s‖2 is 0 for even m and − 4
(m−1)2(3m−1)2 (negative) for
odd m, so dropping this summand and extracting the square root we get
S ≤ m(α+ β). Substituting the values of α and β according to equation
(1) we get the desired estimations.
It follows from this result that at the worst-case distribution for any
even m the quantum strategy cannot achieve any advantage over the clas-
sical strategies (and for odd m there is no difference asymptotically). It
was quite surprising for us. In fact, it can be proven for any of the distri-
butions πα,β.
Theorem 8 If β ≥ 2
m(3m−4) then
ω
piα,β
q (EEm) = ω
piα,β
c (EEm) = 2β(m− 1)m− 1.
If β < 2
m(3m−4) then for even m:
ω
piα,β
q (EEm) = ω
piα,β
c (EEm) = 1− β(m− 2)m,
and for odd m:
1− β(m− 1)2 ≤ ωpiα,βc (EEm) ≤ ωpiα,βq (EEm) ≤ 1− β(m− 2)m.
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Proof: For the classical game value, we use the strategies from the proof
of Theorem 6. In the case β < 2
m(3m−4) we use the strategy mix described
in that Theorem. Recall that it wins with certainty if x = y and wins
with probability 1− ⌊ (m−1)2
2
⌋/(m(m− 1)) if x 6= y. Thus its game value
is
αm+ β(m− 1)m
(
1− 2⌊(m− 1)
2/2⌋
m(m− 1)
)
.
Since the sum of the probabilities of the distribution is 1, we have mα+
m(m − 1)β = 1 or α = (1 − m(m − 1)β)/m. Substituting this and
simplifying, we get that the game value is 1− 2β⌊ (m−1)2
2
⌋. This is equal
to 1− β(m − 2)m for even m, and 1− β(m− 1)2 for odd m. That gives
the needed lower bounds for ω
piα,β
c in this case.
In the case β ≥ 2
m(3m−4) we use the strategy responding for all i
with a(i) = 0 and b(i) = 1. Since it wins iff x 6= y, its game value is
β(m− 1)m− αm. Substituting the expression of α by β we get that the
game value is 2β(m − 1)m− 1, so ωpiα,βc ≥ 2β(m− 1)m− 1.
For the quantum game value we will use the notation and intermediary
results from the proof of Theorem 7. We obtained there that (ω
piα,β
q )
2 ≤
m2(α+ β)2 + ‖s‖2mβ(mβ − 2(α+ β)). Substituting the α we get
(ω
piα,β
q )
2 ≤ (1− β(m− 2)m)2 + ‖s‖2βm(3m− 4)
(
β − 2
m(3m− 4)
)
.
If β − 2
m(3m−4) < 0 then the second summand is non-positive, so we
can drop it obtaining ω
piα,β
q ≤ 1− β(m− 2)m.
If β − 2
m(3m−4) ≥ 0 then the second summand is non-negative, so we
can estimate it from above by maximizing ‖s‖. Since s is a sum of m
vectors of unit length, ‖s‖ ≤ m. Substituting this value and simplifying
we get ω
piα,β
q ≤ 2β(m− 1)m− 1.
Corollary 1 For m ≥ 4: ωuniq (EEm) = ωunic (EEm) = m−2m .
Proof: The uniform distribution is πα,β with α = β = 1/m
2. Substitut-
ing these values in the previous theorem gives the result.
4.2 n-party AND game
n-party AND game (nAND) is a symmetric XOR game with binary inputs
X1 = . . . = Xn = {0, 1} and V (a | x) = (
⊕n
i=1 ai =
∧n
i=1 xi).
Although this is a natural generalization of the CHSH game (compare
the winning conditions), it appears that this game has not been studied
before. Possibly, this is due to the fact that in the average case the game
can be won classically with a probability that is very close to 1 by a trivial
strategy: all players always outputting ai = 0. If this game is studied
in the worst-case scenario, it becomes more interesting. The following
theorem shows that limn→∞ ωc(nAND) = 1/3.
Theorem 9 ωc(nAND) = 2
n−2/(3 · 2n−2 − 1).
Proof: First, let us notice that there are only four possible deterministic
strategies for any individual player Ai: ai(xi) can be 0, 1, xi or ¬xi. We
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will denote a deterministic n-player strategy by the tuple of individual
strategies (a1(x1), . . . , an(xn)).
For the lower bound we construct a probabilistic mix of deterministic
strategies which achieves the needed game value on all inputs: we take
the strategy (0, 0, . . . , 0) with probability (2n−1−1)/(3 ·2n−1−2), and we
take a strategy picked uniformly randomly from the class desribed below
with the remaining probability (2n − 1)/(3 · 2n−1 − 2).
This class consists of all the strategies where all the non-zero elements
ai(xi) are xi except for the last non-zero element which is either xi or
¬xi picked so that the total number of xi’s in the tuple is odd. It is easy
to check that all these strategies win on the input x1 = . . . = xn = 1
(due to the odd number of xi’s), and that there are 2
n− 1 such strategies
(every element of the tuple can be either 0 or non-zero; the all-zero tuple
is excluded).
Furthermore, for any input apart from the all-ones input there are 2n−1
strategies of the class winning on this input. Indeed, any such input has
at least one 0, suppose i is the position of the first 0. Then we can split all
the strategies of the class except one in pairs: if the strategy has 0 in the
i-th position, then we obtain its match by exchanging the 0 with xi and
adjusting the negation as appropriate, and vice versa, if the i-th element
is non-zero, we put there 0 and adjust the negation. Checking cases
(regarding the position of negation), it is easy to see that the strategies
of one pair have different outputs on the given input, so exactly half of
them wins. The one strategy without pair is (0, . . . , 0, xi, 0, . . . , 0), and it
wins.
The strategy (0, 0, . . . , 0) loses on the all-ones input, and wins on all
the others. So, as needed, the game value of our mix of strategies on the
all-ones input is
2n − 1
3 · 2n−1 − 2 −
2n−1 − 1
3 · 2n−1 − 2 =
2n−2
3 · 2n−2 − 1 ,
and on all the other inputs
2n−1 − 1
3 · 2n−1 − 2 +
2n−1
3 · 2n−1 − 2 −
2n−1 − 1
3 · 2n−1 − 2 =
2n−2
3 · 2n−2 − 1 .
For the upper bound we introduce a distribution π for which no deter-
ministic strategy can exceed the desired value: π(1, 1, . . . , 1) = (2n−1 −
1)/(3·2n−1−2), and for all the other inputs π(x1, . . . , xn) = 1/(3·2n−1−2).
Any constant strategy (i. e. consisting only of 0 and 1) can do no
better than losing on the all-ones input and winning on all the other ones,
and then the game value is
2n − 1
3 · 2n−1 − 2 −
2n−1 − 1
3 · 2n−1 − 2 =
2n−2
3 · 2n−2 − 1 .
If the strategy is not constant, let i be the index of its first non-constant
element (xi or ¬xi). Then all the inputs are split into pairs differing only
in the i-th bit, and the strategy having different values for the inputs of
one pair, wins only in one of them, except for the pair containing the all-
ones input where it may win on both inputs, because it is the only case
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when the responses need to be different. Thus it can maximally achieve
the game value
2n−1 − 1
3 · 2n−1 − 2 +
1
3 · 2n−1 − 2 +
2n−1 − 1
3 · 2n−1 − 2 −
2n−1 − 1
3 · 2n−1 − 2 =
2n−2
3 · 2n−2 − 1 .
In the quantum case, since the game is symmetric with binary inputs,
we can introduce parameters ci being equal to the value of V ((0, . . . , 0) | x)
on any input x containing i ones and n− i zeroes, and pi being equal to
the probability (determined by π) of such kind of input. According to [1],
for such game G:
ωpiq (G) = max
z:|z|=1
∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=0
piciz
i
∣∣∣∣∣
where z is a complex number. By Yao’s principle,
ωq(G) = min
p0,...,pn:
∑
pi=1
max
z:|z|=1
∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=0
piciz
i
∣∣∣∣∣ .
We have for the nAND game: c0 = . . . = cn−1 = 1 and cn = −1. The
following lemma implies that, for large n, the quantum value of the game
is 1
3
+ o(1) and, hence, the maximum winning probability that can be
achieved is 2
3
+ o(1).
Lemma 1
lim
n→∞
min
p0,...,pn:
∑
pi=1
max
z:|z|=1
∣∣∣∣∣
n−1∑
i=0
piz
i − pnzn
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 13
Proof: We prove the lemma by picking particular values of pi and showing
for them that the limit is equal to 1/3. We take pn = 1/3, pi = pq
n−i for
i = 0, . . . , n−1 where q = e− 1√n and p is chosen so that p∑ni=1 qi = 23 , i.e.
p = 2
3
1−q
q(1−qn) . Additionally, since |z| = 1, we can divide the expression
within modulus by zn and use the substitution w = 1/z. We obtain
lim
n→∞
max
w:|w|=1
∣∣∣∣∣p
n∑
i=1
(qw)i − 1
3
∣∣∣∣∣ = limn→∞ maxw:|w|=1
∣∣∣∣23 1− q1− qn w(1− q
nwn)
1− qw −
1
3
∣∣∣∣ .
(2)
From limn→∞ qn = limn→∞ e−
√
n = 0 we get limn→∞(1 − qn) = 1
and, since |w| = 1, limn→∞(1− qnwn) = 1. Thus (2) is equal to
lim
n→∞
max
w:|w|=1
∣∣∣∣23 (1− q)w1− qw − 13
∣∣∣∣ . (3)
Claim 1 For each ǫ > 0 there exists δ0 such that the inequality∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣ 2δw1− (1− δ)w − 1
∣∣∣∣− 1
∣∣∣∣ < ǫ (4)
holds where 0 < δ < δ0 and z ∈ C, and |w| = 1.
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Now Claim 1 gives that (3) is equal to 1/3. We used the fact that
limn→∞ e
− 1√
n = 1 and the substitution 1− q = δ.
Proof: [of Claim 1]
The inequality (4) requires that there exists some number with ab-
solute value 1 that is sufficiently close to 2δw
1−(1−δ)w − 1 or, equivalently,
that there exists some number on a circle in the complex plane with its
center at 1/2 and a radius of 1/2 that is sufficiently close to δw
1−(1−δ)w =
1
1+((1/w)−1)/δ .
The numbers
{
1
1+((1/w)−1)/δ |w ∈ C and |w| = 1
}
form a circle in the
complex plane with its center on the real axis that has common points
with the real axis at 1 and 1
1−2/δ =
δ
δ−2 . The latter circle is sufficiently
close to the circle with its center at 1/2 and radius of 1/2 if we choose
δ0 > 0 sufficiently small so that the value of
δ
δ−2 is sufficiently close to 0.
4.3 n-party MAJORITY game
By replacing the AND function with the MAJORITY function in the
definition of the n-party AND game, we obtain the n-party MAJORITY
game.
More formally, n-party MAJORITY game (nMAJ) is a symmetric
XOR game with X1 = . . . = Xn = {0, 1} and V (a | x) demanding that⊕n
i=1 ai is true if at least half of xi is true, and false otherwise. Similarly
as in the previous section, we introduce parameters ci and pi and use the
expression for game value given in [1]. This time c0 = . . . = c⌈n/2⌉−1 = 1,
c⌈n/2⌉ = . . . = cn = −1.
The following lemma implies that, for large n, the quantum (and thus
also the classical) value of the game is o(1) and, hence, the maximum
winning probability that can be achieved is 1
2
+ o(1). For odd n, set
n = 2k − 1. For even n, set n = 2k, pn = 0 and use the lemma as an
upper bound.
Lemma 2 limk→∞ f(k) = 0 where
f(k) = min
p0,p1,...,p2k−1:
∑
pi=1
max
z:|z|=1
∣∣∣∣∣
k−1∑
i=0
piz
i −
2k−1∑
i=k
piz
i
∣∣∣∣∣ .
Proof:
It is clear that f(k) ≤ g(k) where we obtain g from f by substituting
particular values for pi: pi =
ri
s
where ri = r2k−1−i and ri = 12k−1−2i for
0 ≤ i ≤ k−1, and s = 2∑ki=1 12i−1 . We prove the lemma by showing that
limk→∞ g(k) = 0.
Since |z| = 1, we can multiply the polynomial within the modulus by
z
1
2
−k and use the substitution w = z−
1
2 obtaining that g(k) is equal to:
max
z:|z|=1
∣∣∣∣∣
k−1∑
i=0
piz
i −
2k−1∑
i=k
piz
i
∣∣∣∣∣ = maxw:|w|=1
∣∣∣∣∣
k−1∑
i=0
piw
2k−1−2i −
2k−1∑
i=k
piw
2k−1−2i
∣∣∣∣∣
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=
2
s
max
w:|w|=1
∣∣∣∣∣Im
(
k−1∑
i=0
riw
2k−1−2i
)∣∣∣∣∣ = 2s maxθ
∣∣∣∣∣
k∑
i=1
sin(2i− 1)θ
2i− 1
∣∣∣∣∣
where Im(z) is the imaginary part of z and w = eiθ.
Since the function
∑k
i=1
sin(2i−1)θ
2i−1 is a partial sum of the Fourier series
of a square wave function, we have maxθ
∣∣∣∑ki=1 sin(2i−1)θ2i−1 ∣∣∣ = O(1). Also,
2
s
= o(1) because limk→∞ s =∞. The result follows.
5 Games without common data
Finally, we consider the question: what can the players do if they are
not allowed to share common randomness (nor common quantum state)?
For the case when the probability distribution on the inputs is fixed, this
scenario is equivalent to two players who can share common random-
ness because common randomness can be always fixed to the value that
achieves the best result for the two players.
In the worst-case setting, we get different results. For many games,
not allowing shared randomness results in the players being unable to win
the game with any probability p > 1/2. But for at least one game, players
can still win with a non-trivial probability, even if they are not allowed to
share randomness.
We will use the ωˆ notation for the game value in this case to distinguish
it from the case with shared randomness.
Theorem 10 Suppose G is a two-player XOR game where on every input
exactly one of the two possible values of a ⊕ b wins. If ωˆc(G) > 0 then
ωˆc(G) = 1, i. e. then G can be won deterministically.
Proof: The probability to give the correct answer on input (x, y) is
either
p1xp2y + (1− p1x) (1− p2y) or p1x (1− p2y) + (1− p1x) p2y
where pij is the probability that i-th player will give output 1 on input
j. We can denote both cases as pq + (1− p) (1− q) where 0 ≤ p, q ≤ 1.
If ωˆc(G) > 0 then this expression must be greater than
1
2
, so either both
p and q or both 1 − p and 1 − q are greater than 1
2
(if, say, p > 1
2
and
q < 1
2
, then replacing q by 1
2
would increase the expression, and it would
become equal to 1
2
, contrary to the observation that initially it must have
exceeded 1
2
). If we increase them to 1, the value of the expression only
increases.
So by increasing all the probabilities exceeding 1
2
to 1 and decreasing
the others to 0 we get a deterministic strategy that always wins.
Theorem 11 There exists a two-player bit game G with 0 < ωˆc(G) =(√
5− 2) < 1.
Proof: Consider a game with X = Y = {0, 1} and V (a, b | x, y) =
x ∨ y ≡ a ∧ b.
Let pij be the probability that the i-th player on input j gives output
1. If the player gets input 1, it’s always better to give output 1 than 0, so
13
p11 = p21 = 1. Therefore the probability of players winning on different
inputs are as follows:
00 : 1− p00p10 10 : p10
01 : p00 11 : 1
At the maximal probability of giving the correct answer on the worst input
we have p00 = p10 (if one of them would be less than the other, we could
increase it). Let’s denote this value by p. Then the best result is achieved
when 1−p2 = p. The only positive solution is p = 1
2
(√
5− 1). The result
follows.
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